We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two dierent countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a rst-or second-mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the strategic complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, both countries may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk-dominance to select the leading government. Lastly, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.
Introduction
The issue of leadership is much studied in industrial economics, in particular in relation with duopoly theory, but much less in public economics. Yet this issue cannot be under-estimated in this domain of economics. There are many examples of interdependent decisions made by independent public authorities. To name a few examples, let us mention the case of cross-border externalities, federations, military alliances, environmental issues, transnational public goods. These public authorities rule clearly dierentiated jurisdictions. It is common to oppose core vs periphery jurisdictions, large vs small governments, or dierences in capacities (in military alliances for example). These dierences often translate in strategic asymmetries, as one jurisdiction assumes a leading role with respect to others, setting the agenda, deciding and constraining other jurisdictions, considered and acting as followers.
The present paper aims at formally addressing the issue of leadership in public economics, focusing on the problem of providing public goods in the presence of cross-jurisdiction spillovers. 1 We aim at understanding who is leader (follower) in providing public goods and why. We also want to characterize the consequences of leadership relative to its absence for each jurisdiction involved in this setting.
In order to answer this question, we adopt a game-theoretic approach and dene leadership as the action of moving rst.
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As our approach is parallel to the one adopted in industrial economics to study leadership in duopolies, a brief summary of this research is relevant here. 3 First, taking as given the order of moves in a duopoly, in other words the presence of a leader, industrial economists were interested in assessing the respective advantages of each rm: that is, in comparing the rst-mover and second-mover advantages, dened as 1 Of course, there are many more issues in public economics which can be related to the problem of leadership. We return to this point in the conclusion.
2 See Kempf and Taugourdeau (2005) for a rst exploration of Stackelberg games over scal decisions in a two-country model.
3 Vives (1999) provides a survey of this literature.
1 the payos for this rm of playing either rst or second. Once it was recognized that the two roles of leader and follower lead to dierent advantages, the next step was to attempt to endogenize the moves, that is consider the sequence of moves as the equilibrium result of non-cooperating strategies played by the two rms given their own relative characteristics and their prospective advantage as a leader or as a follower.
d 'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1980) , Gal-Or (1985) and Dowrick (1986) proposed an initial analysis, which has been extended by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Pal (1996) , Amir and Grilo (1999) , van Damme and Hurkens (1999) and more recently by van Damme and Hurkens (2004) or Amir and Stepanova (2006) . The determination of simultaneity versus sequentiality of moves, as well as the assignment of roles of the players in the latter case, is then completely endogenous.
In this paper, we shall follow the same logic. First, using a simple yet fairly general two-jurisdiction model of public good provision and externalities (linked to the public goods) across jurisdictions, we shall characterize the rst-mover and second-mover advantages. Then we shall set-up a timing game, or equivalently the two-period action commitment game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . In the rst stage, the policymaker of each jurisdiction states which role (leading or following) it prefers. Once the solution of this stage is obtained, that is when the two roles are attributed to the two jurisdictions, given their statements, the resulting game is played in the second stage of the timing game. 4 It may happen that two equilibria emerge as the outcome of the rst stage: that is, two sequences of moves are solutions of the two-stage game. In this case, in order to break-up this multiplicity, we resort to the concepts of Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance oered by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . Applying this concept to two dierent specications of our general model, we show how it allows a simple and straightforward explanation of which jurisdiction ends up as the leader.
We prove that both the magnitude of the moves' advantages and the existence and identity of a leader depend on the characteristics of public goods in the utility function. When for both countries the public goods are substitutes, both jurisdictions experience a rst-mover advantage and the solution of the timing game is the Nash simultaneous game. When for both countries the public goods are complements, at least one jurisdiction benets from a second-mover advantage when public goods are complements and the two sequential "basic games" are solutions of the timing game. Finally, in the mixed case, the country for which the public goods are substitutes benets from a rst-mover advantage and is the leader. Then we prove that the use of the risk-dominance criterion always allows us to identify the leader and provides an explanation of this leadership in each of the two specications of the utility function we consider. Overall, the issue of leadership is solved for all cases.
Our work refers to the study of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Several recent contributions can be questioned through our results. The literature on centralization and international unions only considers simultaneous games where countries choose to cooperate or not (see for instance, Lockwood (2002) , Besley and Coate (2003) or Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) ). It can be deduced from our analysis that the usual benchmark used to appreciate political centralization, i.e. the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, may not be relevant when public goods are complements.
The works on global public goods (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) or Barrett (2007) ) are also related to our analysis since we establish a taxonomy of international spillovers and their consequences in term of their global provision and the "natural" (since endogenous) emergence of a leader. We emphasize that the free rider issue is not as strong as predicted in the literature, when public goods are complements. Indeed, in this situation, a sequential situation emerges as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE), which involves a higher provision of public goods 3 to this at the simultaneous Nash equilibrium.
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Finally, our analysis might be fruitful in political science where the concepts of hegemony and leadership, often confounded, remain a hot topic (see Keohane (1984) or Pahre (1999) ). By considering the leadership as endogenous, we are able to formalize a clear distinction between hegemony and leadership: hegemony would be a structural variable (an ad hoc assumption in the utility functions), while leadership would characterize the solution of a timing game.
The next section sets up the two-jurisdiction model we use and studies the three non-cooperating games, with either synchronous or sequential moves, that can be played, and derives the rst-and second-mover advantages for a very general specication of the utility function. The third section tackles the selection of a leader by means of a timing game, relying when necessary on the concept of risk-dominance.
The last section concludes.
2 Public good provision non-cooperating games.
We consider an economy consisting of two jurisdictions or countries (D and E).
There is no mobility accross countries. Their populations are normalized to 1. Each country l (5 {D> E}) provides a local public good, in quantity j l , which generates some externalities for the other country, namely country m (6 = l). There is perfect information. Inhabitants in country l are assumed to have preferences that can be 5 Our analysis may also be linked to the work of Varian (1994) , who considers a sequential game of private contribution. This author highlights that the ability to commit to a contribution reinforces the free-rider problem and he concludes that the amount of public good sequentially provided is never larger than the amount simultaneously provided. We extend his analysis in two ways: rst we consider the leader as endogenous; second, since Varian (1994) focuses exclusively on the contribution game proposed by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) , he considers only public goods as substitutes, we study here all the possible congurations. Whereas the conclusions of Varian (1994) remain valid for substitutes and an endogenous leadership, they do not hold anymore as soon as complement public goods considered.
Comparison of the levels of public good provisions.
Our analysis oers a taxonomy of inter-jurisdictional interactions. Indeed, we consider six cases depending on the sign of the spillovers and the presence of complementarity or substitutability among national public goods. 7 The literature focuses essentially on one kind of interactions, when either complementarity or substitutability is considered. 8 Indeed, many authors implicitly assume a standard technology of agregation of jurisdiction's contribution, the weighted summation, which may be relied to the canonical model of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) . This hypothesis involves substitutability among national public goods. Thus, the standard formal- Hirshleifer (1983) 10 proposed two other agregation technologies: the "weakestlink" and the "best-shot". These functions have been used in the context of global public goods (see Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) or Barrett (2007) ). These two cases generate several di!culties since the underlying functions are not dierentiable. Cornes (1993) proposed a class of functions which encompasses the dierent preceeding cases. Cornes and Hartley (2007) A 0) might then correspond to the analysis of defence expenditures between two allied countries (see 7 We do not assume that the signs of the spillovers dier for the two countries. 8 Several papers assume functional forms such that l>m 12 (=) = 0. 9 These authors use a more restrictive function than our, since they assume:
l (j l > j m ) = y (j 1 + j 2 ), with 0 ? ? 1 and y 00 (=) ? 0= 10 See Hirshleifer (1985) for a correction.
Ihori (2000)) and some works on the global public goods, higlighting a better-shot agregation technology (see Barrett (2007) ). Finally, to our knowledge, the mixed cases have not been considered in the literature. Dierent public goods can logically be linked to dierent cases, depending on their complementarity or substitutability and the sign of their induced spillovers. For example, national programs on aireld infrastructure building can be considered as complementary and generating positive externalities. On the other hand, national plans for biodiversity conservation can be substitutes and related to positive externalities.
The comparison of the levels of public goods requires to consider six cases depending on the sign of [ 2 (=) and [ 12 (=) (when it is assumed to be non-null).
11 In the appendix, we establish the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 The public good provision levels solutions of the Nash and Stackelberg games are such that:
Consider the rst case ([ When the two countries are symmetric, that is when
the mixed cases disappear. It is immediate to derive from the previous proposition the comparison between the public good provisions under this assumption: 
A 0 (negative spillovers and complements):
? 0 (positive spillovers and substitutes):
? 0 (negative spillovers and substitutes):
This proposition can be explained following the same reasoning as for the previous proposition. We notice that the coexistence of two rankings in cases (l) and (ll) disappears with the asymmetries between the two
2.4 First-mover and second-mover advantages.
Given these rankings, we can compute the rst-and second-mover advantages. These advantages has been extensively used and discussed in the duopoly theory. 12 Here they will allow us to understand the stakes linked to the possible existence of leadership in public good provision. Following Amir and Stepanova (2006) we dene the notions of "rst-" and "second-mover advantage" as follows:
Denition 1 Country l has a rst-mover advantage (a second-mover advantage) if its equilibrium payo in the Stackelberg game in which it leads, denoted by J V l , is higher (lower) than in the Stackelberg game in which it follows (J V m ).
Formally, country l benets from a rst-mover advantage when
and from a second-mover advantage when
Given this denition we oer the following Proposition:
12 See Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002) . =) , country m, the country for which the public goods are substitutes, has a rst-mover advantage. Country l has a rst-mover advantage (a second-mover advantage) when externalities from the foreign public good are positive (negative).
Proof. see Appendix A.2.
Let us rst focus on the case when the public goods are complements for both countries (though aecting them dierently) and spillovers are positive. At least one player prefers to be a second-mover as then, it optimally benets from the higher provision decided by the rst-mover, which generate positive externalities. To be second-mover allows this country to reduce its own provision of public good, in other terms it free-rides the leader. However this free-riding is less than in the simultaneous Nash game where spillovers are positive. The other cases can be explained by similar reasonings. In the case of substitutable public goods and positive spillovers, which is the case studied by Varian (1994) , our result is consistent with his.
3 Selecting a leader through a timing game.
We have just seen that the existence and identity of a leader matters because of rstor second-mover advantages. This puts to the fore the issue of determining whether a leader emerges, and if yes, its identity. In order to address this issue, we want to endogenously dene the order of moves, and not take it as given as in the previous section by resorting to a timing game, following the seminal study of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) .
A timing game is a sequential game in the rst stage of which players noncooperatively choose their preferred order of moves. Once the order of moves has been dened, players act accordingly in the second stage, that is non-cooperatively choose their level of public good provision, applying the order of moves selected in the rst stage. In other words, a timing game is an extended game e J which encompasses the preceding games. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) we restrict our attention to the SPE of e J.
More precisely, e J is dened as follows: at the rst or preplay stage to the "basic game", players simultaneously and independently of each other decide whether they prefer to move early or late in the "basic game". In the same way as Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , we assume that if country l chooses leadership (strategy Leads), it commits itself to setting its national policy as leader and if it chooses to be a follower (Follows), it commits itself to following the other country's decision. Once the timing choice of each player is announced, the order of moves is dened according to the following rules: if countries choose complementary roles, there preferred moves are enforced and one of the two possible Stackelberg games will emerge. If both choose lead or follow, as their decisions are inconsistent, it is decided that the simultaneous non-cooperative game will be enforced. That is, the second stage corresponds to the realization of the selected "basic game": it is one of the three games studied in the previous section.
Notice that, in choosing their role (leader or follower), the two players also choose which kind of behavior they prefer. Therefore this game has the following normal form:
13 Country E
Leads Follows
We remark that the literature on endogenous timing remains divided to qualify the situation where both players choose to lead. Indeed, Dowrick (1986) and more recently van Damme and Hurkens (1999) consider a Stackelberg warfare, where both countries apply their action as a leader. In contrast, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) or Amir and Stepanova (2006) apprehend this situation as the static Nash game. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) (p. 42) emphasize that Stackelberg warfare can occur only through error, since the underlying strategy of one player is not consistent with the other player's strategy.
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where
Solutions to the leadership problem.
The solution to this reduced form game is equivalent to characterizing the solution to the leadership problem. There is no leader when both government choose the same action; a leader emerges when they choose complementary roles. The result of the timing game can be related to the nature of the interactions between the two countries. We obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) If public goods are complements, the subgame perfect equilibria are the two Stackelberg situations whatever is the sign of spillovers; (ii) If public goods are substitutes, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the simultaneous moves situation whatever is the sign of spillovers; (iii) If public goods are complements for country l and substitutes for country m, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the Stackelberg situation where country m leads and country l follows whatever is the sign of spillovers.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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The following table summarizes the results stated in Propositions (2) and (3): We remark that the nature of the spillovers (positive or negative) does not aect the presence of a rst-or second-mover advantage, nor the kind of the SPE. Given this proposition, it is straightforward to see that there is no leader in the case of substitutable public goods as the solution to the timing game is the Nash game, and that the leader in the mixed case is the government for whom the public goods are substitutable. In the former case, this outcome comes from the fact that both countries would like to exploit a rst-mover advantage and suer as a second-mover compared to the Nash solution. Consequently Leads is a dominant strategy for each of them and no leader emerges from the timing game.
In the latter case (the mixed case), the presence of a leader comes from the fact that the government which benets from complementary public goods prefers being a follower to the Nash case, whereas the government which benets from substitutable public goods always prefers to lead. There is then a unique SPE.
On the other hand, when the public goods are complements, there are two possible Stackelberg equilibria solutions to the timing game. This comes from the fact that in any possible case with complement public goods, both the rst-and secondmovers are better o than under a Nash equilibrium. This raises a coordination issue: how to solve the tie? In the next section, we provide a solution for the selection of a leader by means of the risk-dominance criterion.
Selecting a leader in the complementarity case.
To solve the coordination issue when the public goods are complements, more formally, when [ l 12 (=) A 0> two criteria can be used for the selection of the leader in this case: the Pareto-dominance and the risk-dominance. Given Proposition 2, it is clear that no equilibrium Pareto-dominates the other one when both rms have a second-mover advantage. Hence, following Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , we have to turn to the risk-dominance criterion. It amounts to a minimization of the risk of a coordination failure due to strategic uncertainty. 15 Harsanyi and Selten (1988) dene the concept of risk-dominance as follows:
Denition 2 An equilibrium risk-dominates another equilibrium when the former is less risky than the latter, that is the risk-dominant equilibrium is the one for which the product of the deviation losses is the largest.
Risk-dominance allows a simple characterization for 2 × 2 games with two Nash 
In our framework, Pareto-dominance always involves risk-dominance, the inverse is not true. There is here no trade-o between risk and payo-dominance. When
for both countries, Pareto-dominance is not relevant. We then have to consider only the notion of risk-dominance to solve the coordination issue. But, as stressed by Amir and Stepanova (2006) , a resolution of the problem does not seem possible without resorting to an explicit specication of the payo functions. These authors use a linear demand function as in van Damme and Hurkens (1999) .
We will consider in the following sub-sections two cases in the presence of asymmetries between countries, relying on two specications of the [ l (=) functions.
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These cases are characterized by complementary public goods, but they exhibit dierent assumptions on externalities.
A Cobb-Douglas specication.
We consider a Cobb-Douglas specication of the function [ l (=), that is, we assume:
16 Obviously this criterion is not relevant in the symmetric case. In the symmetric case, both possible equilibria lead to the same value of . Therefore, the risk-dominance criterion does not apply. A solution could then be to select an equilibrium randomly. But notice that the two equilibria are not equivalent from the point of view of a particular government. Depending on which equilibrium is chosen, one country loses and the other gains with respect to the discarded equilibrium. 17 The condition (2) of existence and uniqueness of a simultaneous Nash equilibrium involves:
The externality eect is always positive for both countries. We obtain the following values for the levels of public good provision: The product of deviation losses is given by: 
which is impossible since
E > the spillover eect is smaller from E to D than from D to E: E values more the foreign public good than it is the case for D. Hence, E has more interest in Follows than country D.
Both countries lose in case of simultaneous moves. Hence, since both players know that E is more interested in being the follower than D and that a consistent choice of moves delivers for both players positive advantages compared with the outcome of disagreements over moves, the equilibrium is that D chooses Leads and E Follows.
E is able to push D to assume leadership by selecting Follows and thus can extract the second-mover advantage. The reverse explanation holds when D A E = In the Appendix A.4, we explore other combinations of the parameters, allowing the four coe!cients l and l to vary and we give a set of su!cient conditions so that the timing game ends up with one leader.
More precisely, if
When the set of conditions given above is satised, using the risk-dominance crite-rion, the outcome of the timing game is that D leads and E follows.
If the two relative coe!cients pondering the national public goods ( D and E ) are su!ciently distant ( D ?? E ), then the country with the lowest coe!cient, D, emerges as the leader from the timing game. As a leader, by increasing its own level compared to the Nash level 19 , it will trigger a larger increase in the other country's provision because of the complementarity assumption, which is benecial to the leader because of the positive externality eect; on the other hand, if E is a leader,
given that D as a follower will not tend to act much, i.e. increase its provision level (for opposite reasons), the gain of D as a follower with respect to the Nash solution, is not that large. The opposite reasoning explains why the country with the largest coe!cient, E, has the more to lose from not being a follower. Since this is understood by both players, E chooses Follows and D Leads.
Resorting to simulations, we can also identify the roles assumed by the two countries in the equilibrium of the timing game. The following graphic give some illustrations of the function
When the curb is under the abscissa axe, the risk-dominant equilibrium is the Stackelberg one where country D follows.
19 cf Proposition 1.
3.4 A log specication.
Let us now assume a log specication of the [ l (=) > that is:
The parameter is the degree of spillovers generated by public goods. Depending on the sign of , the externalities might be positive or negative. We consider here only negative spillovers ( ? 0) since for A 0, the public goods are substitutes and no coordination issue appears. Wlog, we assume that
s agents value more the public good basket than agents in country 2> and therefore are more adversely aected by the other country's provision (ceteris paribus). An 20 The condition (2) always holds for 1 ? since
exemple of such public goods is defense spending among rival countries: inhabitants of country D are more sensitive to their national security. The following table gives the levels of public good in the dierent games.
Nash Equilibrium
We deduce the following rankings of the level of the public goods, directly from Proposition 1:
Let us denote by ( D > ) the dierence of the products given in (5):
We then oer the following Proposition 5 When (8) Proof. See Appendix A.5.¤ Playing rst is less risky for the country that values the less the basket of public goods. This safer equilibrium in which country D moves second is the neutral focal point and, adopting the risk-dominance concept, the players will coordinate on it.
With the logarithm specication, we are able to establish that this equilibrium is also Pareto-dominant. In other terms, country E always has a rst-mover advantage, while country D has a second-mover advantage.
Remark that the complementarity eect is higher for country D> as [ 4 Conclusion.
The tools applied to study leadership in duopoly theory can be used to address the relevance of leadership in public economics. Doing so in the matter of public good provisions by two interdependent yet non-cooperating jurisdictions generates neat and quite general results, which can easily be explained and may be applied to various situations. Formally, leadership is equated to moving rst in a noncooperative game, that is being a rst-mover.
As a rst step, a positive comparison between the equilibrium levels obtained in the simultaneous and sequential (non-simultaneous) games allows us to stress the role of externalities and the nature of the interactions between the public goods in the utility functions of the various agents (which are not assumed to be identical across countries): whether they are complements or substitutes.
Then we can make explicit who benets from a rst-or second-mover advantage 21 using the formulas given above.
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in the sequential game. This solely depends on the complementarity or substitutability property of the public goods. As a result, it happens that being a leader is not always benecial but is so under certain circumstances only.
We are then able to tackle the issue of the existence and if any, the identity, of a leader by means of a timing game. Again the complementarity or substitutability property of the public goods plays a critical role. In particular, when public goods are substitutes for all agents, then there is no leader. On the other hand, when public goods are complements, the timing game generates two equilibria with each country as a leader, respectively. We resort to the risk-dominance criterion to break the tie in two cases with particular specications of the utility function, exhibiting complementarity. On the whole, the results we obtain are strikingly simple yet general, and easy to understand.
We provide a taxonomy of inter-jurisdictional interactions. Our results may be used to reconsider the literature on political integration or centralization, where the used benchmark is the simultaneous Nash equilibrium. When public goods are complements, it could be argue that the relevant benchmark for assessing the gains from centralization is not the simultaneous Nash equilibrium but a Stackelberg equilibrium as the two countries may be better o with such a non-cooperative equilibrium and may even resort to a timing game to select it.
As we have just said above, the tools that we have been using may be used to study other issues in public economics. An immediate candidate which comes to mind is the issue of tax competition either on production factors or on commodities.
One also can think of applying them in the context of international trade as well as political economy problems.
It is also possible to relax the assumption of perfect information for both players and adapt the notions we have just used to handle cases with imperfect informa-tion. 22 These issues are left for future research.
and they are complements in both countries. We have:
Combining the FOC for three dierent games and the sign of (14) 
From Table ( 13) and (16) 
We note that in the symmetric case only one possible ranking is possible: 
Combining the FOC for three dierent games and the sign of (18) 
From Table ( 
In the symmetric case, we have: 
In the symmetric case, we have:
